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Abstract 
In  this  paper,  a  literature  review  has  been  presented  on  the  subject  of  public  private 
partnerships for the development of infrastructure projects. The central question in the paper 
was: ‘Is PPP a viable option for investments in infrastructure from a theoretical point of 
view?’  The  theoretical perspectives from  the  discipline  ‘economics  of  the  public  sector’ 
result in some interesting insights. Firstly, from a cost point of view it is possible that the 
government is more efficient and the private party is more efficient in terms of turnover. 
Secondly, PPP is no solution to the budgetary shortages of governments. The financial cost 
reduction for the government is not proven scientifically so far. The inclusion of private 
parties will probably result in efficiency but also in cost increases. Thirdly, PPP seems to 
increase the quality of public services, but at a higher cost. Furthermore, the exact realised 
efficiency is never to be found, because a comparison (actual numbers) between a PPP and 
the traditional way can’t be made. Process managment shows that it is no simple task to turn 
a PPP into a success. When the participating parties are persuaded of the advantages that the 
cooperation between public and private parties can offer, have chosen consciously for the 
PPP, and are prepared to invest in cooperation for the long-term, then PPP can offer means 
to pursue the defined objectives. If true cooperation is aimed for, costs, risks, and profits 
must be shared instead of devided. The joint venture can provide insights into the process of 
sharing. The theoretical perspectives offered by business economics provide insight in the 
way businesses operate and what the consequences are for cooperation with investments in 
infrastructure.  Firstly,  in  general  it  is  unattractively  for  private  parties  to  invest  in 
infrastructure.  In  order  to  make  it  more  attractive,  profits  can  be  offered  to  the  private 
parties. However, this will increase the total costs of the project. Overall, the major problems 
lie in the distinction between public responsibilities and private aspirations. 
Theory  and  facts  prove  that  PPP  seems  not  a  very  viable  option  for  investments  in 
infrastructure (the right part ‘no’ of the table). The left part is the arguments in favour of 
PPP. However, most arguments  are  not  proven but  appear  to  be ‘positive‘goals that are 
aimed  for  by  PPP.  While  the  right  part  of  the  table  appear  to  be  facts  that  are  proven 
scientifically. 
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1  Introduction 
Public  private  partnerships  (further  PPP)  are  frequently  presented  as  the  solution  for 
budgetary shortages for governments at European, national and regional levels (van Ham and 
Koppenjan, 2001). A PPP invests in infrastructure whereby efficient cooperation is claimed 
to have advantages for both public and private parties. For governments, advantages could be 
higher (or the same) quality against lower project costs, or a higher (social) quality against a 
higher cost. The final goal might then be the improvement of the quality of public services 
(Advani and Borins, 2001). For businesses, advantages could be financial output (profits) 
and possibly the development of new  markets (WRR, 1994). In Europe, it proves to be 
difficult to really interest private businesses for investments in infrastructure. Therefore, the 
central question, that we adress in this paper, is: ‘Is PPP a viable option for investments in 
infrastructure from a theoretical point of view?'  
In section 2, the history of investments in infrastructure is given, large infrastructure projects 
are defined and a description is given of the contexts of PPP. Section 3 considers PPP from 
three theoretical disciplines. These disciplines are economics of the public sector, process 
management and business economics. Section 4 contains the conclusion of this article. 
2  Infrastructure investment projects and the role of PPP 
In this chapter, type and history of infrastructure projects that might be suitable for PPP are 
described. Furthermore, public private cooperation is analysed. 
2.1  History of investments in infrastructure in Europe 
Since the Napoleontic time, governments play an ever more active role in construction of 
infrastructure. Its purpose has always been to guarantee infrastructure according to a detailed 
government  intervention  to  safeguard  social  interests  (Groote,  1995).  In  defence  of 
infrastructure development one  often refers to the economic benefits  of it.  Infrastructure 
development not only generates direct effects, but also -and especially- indirect effects. The 
latter effects play an important part in the political discussion about the volume and the 
location of investments in infrastructure. However, often the discussion remains abstract and 
vague when its effects are not materialised empirically. Untill recently, designing, building 
maintaining and financing infrastructure were traditional government tasks in Europe. This 
can be illustrated by the construction of the rail network in the second half of the 19
th century 
in the Netherlands. For 1860, the net existed of four lines with total length of 350 kilometres. 
After adopting the railway law, this number grew in twenty-five years to 1250 kilometres. In 
1933,  in  the  Netherlands,  it  was  decided  to  start  with  the  construction  of  the  national 
motorway network. In comparison with other countries, this was rather early (only Italy, 
Germany and the United States had decided about motorways at that moment). The first 
motorway built according to the new principles became available in the Netherlands in 1934 
already. It was the motorway of Utrecht to The Hague (Buiter, 1997). From the start, the 
government did financing and the construction of motorways. 
Since the Second World War, a distinction can be made in three different periods in which 
investments in infrastructure are treated differently. The first period runs from approximately Concessions to PPP  3 
1945 up to 1970 (roughly the period of rebuilding in Europe). Rebuilding was a common 
goal, which lent itself pre-eminently for (intensive) cooperation between government and 
private parties. A lot of infrastructure projects thus frequently were executed by means of a 
form of PPP. The cooperation goals were simple aimed at building roads. During the sixties, 
this changed. Growing differences between public and private goals made cooperation more 
difficult. The second period (1970-1982), is characterised by a growing gap between the 
public and private sector. Suspicion and mistrust replaced the cooperation of the 1
st period. 
In this period, governmental policy was especially aimed at town renewal. Social objectives 
in governmental policy played an important role as a result of which less space was available 
for input of businesses. Because of this, cooperation in investments in infrastructure hardly 
took place. In the third period (1982 up to present), more PPP took place. The beginning of 
this period can be characterised by economic decline and high unemployment. Governments 
had to work more efficient and to aim at realising feasible goals. Partly, the answer came 
from working more closely with businesses again. Governments focussing on core tasks, 
deregulating sectors, decentralising and privatising created more opportunities for business 
initiatives.  These  developments,  combined  with  relaxing  controls  have  far-reaching 
consequences  for  the  role  of  the  government  at  the  financing  and  construction  of 
infrastructure (Fukuyama, 1992; Henry, 1993). In the financing of port infrastructure this has 
already conducted to larger efficiency and lower costs (Kent and Ashar, 2001). But, until 
now private financing of infrastructure has most significantly taken place in Latin America, 
the Caribbean and Eastern Asia (World bank, 1996). In Europe, until now, the results have 
been limited. It is thus too optimistic to think that by private involvement the inefficiency of 
the government can be entirely made up for. But, from financial perspective it is attractive to 
involve private parties to create economic and commercial value. 
A  new  period  for  investments  in  infrastructure  might  be  starting  as  in  recent  years  the 
realisation has grown in the EU that investments in infrastructure, whether in roads or rail, 
should be intensified  (Ministry  VROM 1991, Ministry EZ 1997, European Commission, 
2001). After more than a decade of relatively little attention towards infrastructure in the 
early ninety’s, the need for an intensified investment program is clear.  
 
2.2  Infrastructure projects 
In general, large infrastructure projects are the most suitable for public private cooperation 
(WRR, 1994). Larger projects offer more opportunities for larger efficiency savings that can 
be realised. A large project can be defined as a project with a large physical scope, a large 
financial scope and economic impact (more than 1 billion euro), national importance and/or 
political importance, a technical, legal and organisational complex question, a question that 
needs to be addressed fast, extensive resistance, negative (environmental) effects and plural 
objectives (WRR, 1994). Such projects might offer possible interesting starting points for 
private  involvement  at  planning,  construction,  financing,  maintenance  and/or  operating 
infrastructure. However, many governments in Europe aim for decentralisation. This might 
result  in  smaller  projects  on  regional/local  levels,  thereby  reducing  the  number  of  large 
projects and thus the prospects for PPP. Concessions to PPP  4 
Infrastructure 
Infrastructure can be defined as everything that links A with B. Geerts and Heestermans 
(1992) present the following definition: the total of property supplies such as ways, bridges, 
airports, ports, etc.. In a study to the meaning of this term (Nijkamp et al., 2000) it appeared 
that infrastructure is a broad concept and a lot of different definitions exist. In the study, 
infrastructure has been defined as: ‘that property supplies which increase the efficiency of 
the use of the production factors and meet the following conditions: 
·  infrastructure is directly productive; 
·  it is characterised by stock characteristics (capital goods); 
·  has the character of a (semi) public good. 
In this paper, the emphasis is mainly on road infrastructure in Europe. A complicating factor 
for many infrastructure projects (and thus PPP) is the fact that cost estimates for projects 
usually  are  not  correct.  Globally,  in  90  percent  of  the  infrastructure  projects,  costs  are 
underestimated. The average cost underestimation is 28 percent (Flyvberg et al., 2002). For 
infrastructure projects, time and efficiency profits are usually the main drivers for a PPP (van 
Ham and Koppenjan, 2001). Time savings seems possible through PPP, however, efficiency 
savings are less feasible. PPP will results in more accurate cost estimates, leading to cost 
increases for infrastructure projects (with an average of 28%). It seems unlike that efficiency 
can fully compensate these cost increases. 
2.3  Public private Partnerships 
Differently than the theoretical term ‘public private partnership’ suggests, in practice, there 
frequently proves to be talk of a concession instead of a pertnership. The relation between 
public and private parties is formed by means of a sharply delimited contract (concession). 
The question could then be posed if PPP is the correct term for a relation that might actually 
be a concession? To answer this question, it is important first to define PPP. Public means 
belonging  to  the  government  or  being  a  government  task  or  service  (Geerts  and 
Heestermans,  1992). Private means  belonging to  or originating from  a private person or 
private persons (Geerts and Heestermans, 1992). Partnership (or cooperation) is defined as 
working with each other on the same task. Where ‘together’ stands for ‘considered as one 
entity’ (Geerts and Heestermans, 1992). For example, together funding a separate entity for 
sharing  costs,  benefits,  and  risks.  In  accordance  with  the  definition  of  the  term  PPP,  a 
concession does not seem to fit. A term as, for example, public private agreement (PPA) is 
perhaps better at its place.  
Several  types  of  agreements  (or  cooperation)  can  be  distinguished  (Kenniscentrum  PPS, 
1999  and 2002).  The  difference  can  be  in exploitation, execution,  and/or planning.  In a 
traditional infrastructure investment setting, the government does everything from designing, 
building, financing, and maintaining. Generally, governments do have lower costs of capital 
and therefore it would be wise that governments finance the infrastructure (the traditional 
setting). Furthermore, Mullen and Williams (2004) show that the costs of capital do have a 
statistically significant effect on maintenance/repair costs. The joint venture is the ultimate 
form of partnership (a real PPP). The infrastructure is planned and realised through a joint Concessions to PPP  5 
entity.  Usually,  this  is  not  the  setting  for  the  development  of  infrastructure  in  Europe. 
Another form is the concession. The government gives a right to a private company for a 
certain period. The private company is responsible for building, financing, and maintaining 
the infrastructure. After expiring, the concession goes back to the government. In practice, 
PPP is defined as a cooperation in which the public and private sector jointly develop – with 
conservation of their own identity and responsibility – a project to realise appreciation, and 
this is based on a clear task and risk partitioning (http://www.pps.minfin.nl). The Algemene 
Rekenkamer (2002) uses a broader definition; ‘PPP is considered as forms of cooperation 
where exists’: 
·  not-without engagement interaction between governments and companies; 
·  allocation of control, costs and dangers; 
·  appreciation at the partitioning of convergent aims; 
·  both social and commercial characteristics 
·  conservation of the respective identity and responsibility of involved parties.  
Given the history of infrastructure investments, the charcteristics of infrastructure projects 
and  of  partnerships,  a  number  of  questions  and  dilemmas  arise.  In  random  order  the 
following questions and dilemmas have proven their relevance within the Dutch context and 
might apply to the European context as well (Spit 2004): 
·  How do you ‘tempt’ your private partners into contributing to any uneconomic parts 
of the project? 
·  With whom and how many private partners do you embark on the project? 
·  How do you organise the partnership and what position do you choose as a 
government – do you want to be in charge or do you accept a role as an equal (or 
lesser) partner? 
·  How do you organise on a public level the partnership between the government and 
other authorities involved? 
·  Are you capable of providing private partners with the confidence (a reliable 
partner), who will follow a consistent policy during the long course of the project? 
·  How do you ensure the involvement of and support from the inhabitants of your 
city? 
There is no simple and unambiguous answer to these questions. Each PPP project has its 
own characteristics and requires its own specific approach. This is also the view of PPP 
experts. From the Dutch experiences until now, many  valuable recommendations can be 
distilled.  Two research bureaus  (Ernst  & Young  and the  Central Planning Bureau) have 
summarized them in their reports. Their main recommendations are:  
·  The objectives of the PPP-project: A government should begin with clearly 
formulating the objectives they would like to achieve in a possible PPP project. 
Preferably, these objectives should be measurable. This may seem evident, but 
evaluations show that this is often not the case. In some of the Utrecht cases there 
were clear visions of what the government wanted to achieve, but the problems in 
the subsequent phases could not be foreseen. 
·  PPP or not?: A local authority (or firm) should only choose for public-private 
partnership if its added value is clear (combining resources, knowledge and skills). Concessions to PPP  6 
However, in order to make this choice a well-grounded one, informal talks with 
prospective partners are often required. A government has to make sure, that there is 
a ‘minimum variant’ (a solution that does not include PPP) to fall back on. Such a 
fallback option strengthens the negotiating position of a government towards the 
private parties and provides clarity on the added value of a public-private 
partnership. 
·  The selection of partners: Partners should be selected based on competence. Market 
mechanisms will have a positive effect on price and quality. This may be true, but 
still most municipalities choose for a simple invitation of private partners or a 
private tender – and not for a public tender. It strongly depends on the project and 
the local circumstances which method of selection is to be preferred. In case of the 
UCP project in Utrecht e.g., there was little to select. Here the choice for partners 
was a direct consequence of the (land) positions they took up in the area to be 
developed. 
·  The delineation of the project: It is an art to find the right balance between the 
ambitions of the participating parties and the feasibility of the project. Each partner 
has to benefit from it. The government usually expects from its private partners a 
contribution towards the costs of unprofitable items or a share in the profits on 
profitable items. As for the UCP-project in Utrecht the ambitions of the partners, 
especially those of the government, had been taken into account. In retrospect, the 
scope of the project was probably too broad. It was difficult to break the project up 
into manageable parts. 
·  The shape of the partnership: for a PPP various legal forms are possible. 
Municipalities and private partners can establish a business together (whether or not 
with risk baring capital from the government). Alternatively, they can shape their co-
operation in contracts. In the Netherlands both types are used. Basically, the Dutch 
experiences show that it is not recommendable to establish a business together if this 
has no visible added value. The crucial point is always that proper arrangements 
have to be made concerning the tasks and risks. This can best be formulated in legal 
contracts. Experts often state that the best contracts contain a paragraph on conflict 
management on which all partners agree. If such a paragraph is missing, then the 
feasibility of the partnership is limited.  
·  Confidence: A very soft, yet very important aspect is mutual confidence between the 
partners and their representatives in the partnership. Openness about ambitions, 
plans and costs all add to this confidence. For the municipal authorities this implies: 
to ensure that all officials participating (one way or the other) in the partnership are 
very well acquainted with the wishes of the government, but also are acquainted 
with the ambitions of the business community (speak a similar language). Generally, 
private partners are averse to what they see as the whims and inconsistencies of 
public authorities. Sometimes, however, a government has no other choice than to be 
inconsistent, as was the case in Utrecht with the UCP-project. Eventually the 
election proved to provide such a change in the political administration that it could 
not but cause an important inconsistency in the partnership. 
·  Support: It is important that there is sufficient support for the project among the 
population. It seems an obvious advice, but reality –at least in the Netherlands- show Concessions to PPP  7 
otherwise. The question is how to organise this in a right way. Large infrastructure 
projects are usually not very warmly welcomed by the inhabitants. There is often 
resistance to change (at all), to the temporarily inconvenience of the building 
activities or to specifics of the objectives of the project. A proactive council in order 
to address these feelings of resistance seems then inevitable. But then the question 
rises: how can a government bring the project into the open without violating the 
intended result to much, including the necessary costs?  
When compared to other complex projects, infrastructure planning adds two extra problems 
(De Bruijn et. al. 1996): the problem of location (where will it be located) and the problem of 
time  (which  causes  uncertainty).  The  latter is  particularly  important  because it  fuels  the 
legitimacy issue. Therefore, the question whether or not the money could better be spent on 
issues such as tackling poverty issues or subsidising employment, is gaining importance as 
the process continues, herewith complicating the progress. In the next section, economics 
and organisation management will provide theoretical insights into the basics of the sketched 
problems. 
 
3  Theoretical disciplines 
In this section, three theoretical disciplines, which are important for PPP projects, come up 
for  discussion.  The  fields  are  economics  of  the  public  sector,  process  management  and 
business economics. The discipline of economics of the public sector is important in order to 
understand  the  role  of  the  government  in  investments  in  infrastructure  and  to  identify 
government goals in PPP from a more theoretical point of view. The discipline of process 
management is important because this analyses the cooperation between public and private 
parties in a PPP from a theoretical background. The discipline of business economics is 
important because this analyses the basics of business economics and the role the private 
parties are interested in (in a PPP) from a theoretical perspective. The theory is used to 
evaluate the basic principles of PPP projects. 
3.1  Economics of the public sector 
Costs and benefits form the public sector and businesses 
According to Dietrich (1994), two important principles have had a large influence on the 
economic  perspective  on  the  public  sector  and  its  relation  with  private  sector  activities 
(businesses).  Firstly,  both  sectors are  involved  at  several  separate  activities  with  several 
separate responsibilities. Secondly, the public sector must restrict itself to developing an 
economic legislative infrastructure. There are situations conceivable where cooperation of 
public  and  private  parties  might  lead  to  efficiency.  The  following  situations  can  be 
distinguished:  
·  the government is more efficient in terms of costs, the private party in terms of 
turnovers. For example, on the cost side there can be private sector failure, because a 
collective good must be produced whereby 'free-riding ' occurs (see figure 1); Concessions to PPP  8 
·  the government is more efficient in terms of turnovers, the private party in terms of 
costs (see figure 2). 
Figure 1. Relation between government costs and business benefits 
Source: adapted from Dietrich, 1994 
Figure 2. Relation between business costs and government benefits 
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Government failure 
These considerations on benefits and costs of governments and private parties might lead to 
interventions. An important consideration for the government to intervene (or not) is the fact 
that an economy is efficient if goods and services are produced maximally, given the inputs. 
The Pareto-optimum is then reached, if it is impossible for a person to improve without 
someone else being more badly finished. If the Pareto-optimum is realized, then conditions 
of consumers’ optimisation (exchange efficiency), cost minimisation (production efficiency) 
and profit maximising (top-level efficiency) have been met. To public goods (in case of 
Pareto efficiency) must apply that the total of the marginal values exceeds the marginal 
costs.  It  must  be  noted  that  for  public  goods  it  is  difficult  to  retrieve  the  marginal 
appreciation of consumers. Government failure exists when the acting of the government 
leads  to  Pareto-inefficiency.  Another  important  economic  reason  for  the  government  to 
intervene is the fact that complete competition does not lead on all markets to the most 
optimum outcome. However, if full competition comes about, this is also called Walrasian 
balance (Katz and Rosen, 1998). For this balance, assumptions are that behaviour of people 
and organisations is competitive and prices are set at levels where demand meets supply. If 
there  exists  a  structural  problem  with  demand  and  supply  on  a  certain  market  that  has 
consequences for prices and quality, this is called a market failure. Market failure may give 
reason for government intervention. The main reasons for market failure are described in the 
table below. 
Table 1. Types of market failure 
Market failure  Definition  Example  Intervention 
Public goods  Goods  are  non-rival  and  non-
exclusive 
Defence,  street 
lightning 
Government intervention 
External effects  Actions  of  persons/businesses  have 
impacts on others, but prices do not 
reflect these costs 
Pollution, 
congestion 
Tax  or  subsidise  to 




Buyer  and  seller  do  have  different 
information 
Health  care,  2
nd-
hand cars 
Regulate  quality, 
‘pooling’ of insurances 
Increasing  scale 
advantages 
Average  costs  decrease  when 
production increases 
Natural  monopoly 
(water, electricity) 
Social  ownership, 
regulating  private 
monopoly 
Source: Connolly and Munro, 1999 
Other economic considerations of the government to intervene in economic living can be, for 
example, income inequality or poverty. In many Western countries, the last decades, the role 
of the government has been tried to decrease. It is therefore striking that to most countries 
apply that government expenditure has actually increased as a percentage of GNP (OECD, 
1996). Wagner's Law and the Beaumol impact therefore still seem to apply. Wagner's Law Concessions to PPP  10 
states  that  the  government  expenditure  tends  to  grow  more  rapidly  than  the  GNP.  The 
Beaumol impact is the fact that labour-intensive services tend - compared to goods – to 
relatively increase in price. Since many public authorities are labour-intensive (and price 
inelastic), government expenditure has the inclination to increase as a share of GNP. 
Public goods 
A collective good is a good that is non-excludable and therefore it is not possible to split the 
good up in small, marketable entities, as a result of which nobody can be excluded of the 
use. Exclusion is either physical impossible or legislation is (to) expensive. A public good is 
non-rival; the use of the good does not go at the cost of the use of the good by another 
person.  Except  for  the  moment  when  there  is  excessive  demand  (then,  for  example, 
congestion arises). The marginal costs for an extra entity of the not-competing good are 0. 
Particular to this type of goods is the fact that they are generally experienced as particularly 
useful, but that the market (in the most broad sense of the word) does not produce these 
goods. It can be government responsibility to solve this market failure and ensure that the 
social  demand  is  satisfied.  With  collective  goods  it  is  possible  that  'the  tragedy  of  the 
commons' occurs (Hardin, 1968). This is the inclination of free accessible sources to become 
overexploited (e.g. ways, fishery, bunches).  
Is infrastructure a public good? 
Infrastructure used to be a public good. Infrastructure was seldom or with great difficulty 
produced on a free market. It was not economically attractive to businesses to produce them 
because no good price could be stipulated. Supplies of infrastructure have - as if being a 
collective good - the inclination to provoke 'free-riding'. Every citizen separately, wants to 
profit from good roads, but does not want to join in paying, because others will do that 
nevertheless. Caused by technological developments it is nowadays better possible to apply 
excludability  (e.g.  toll  systems,  kilometre  levy).  Moreover  pricing  can  also  prevent 
infrastructure from becoming competing (think of congestion). On the other hand, private 
investors’ profit motives are incongruent with the public good characteristics (Ping et al., 
1999). Therefore, from a theoretical point of view, investments in infrastructure do not seem 
to fit into private investment schedules. The cooperation between public and private parties 
might even lead to the worst of both worlds. No profit maximisation and no optimisation of 
social welfare. Research by Tsai and Chu (2003) shows that in the case of a Built-Operate-
Transfer project with governmental regulation, the performance is actually in between profit 
and social welfare optimisation. 
Investments in infrastructure 
The scope of the private involvement by investments in transport infrastructure depends – 
among other things – on the characteristics of the investment. Investments in infrastructure 
have a number of specific, economic characteristics (ECMT, 1990, Wiegmans, et al., 2002):  
·  the expected economic life span is very long, from 20 years up to more than a 
century. For this reason, also the pay-back time is long (15 up to 30 years); Concessions to PPP  11 
·  the construction period can be characterised by high investment amounts which 
causes directly high interest expenditure; 
·  the variable costs tend to be low in comparison with the fixed costs. In such cases, 
pricing strategies according to the marginal costing principle (which is economically 
optimal) will not produce sufficient output on the invested money. In general, this 
means that investments in infrastructure are unattractive to private parties; 
·  the construction period lasts long (2-7 years depending on the scale of the project); 
·  there are many procedures before the real construction starts; 
·  the investment is irreversible the moment the project has started (halting the project 
would lead to high costs and alternative application is frequently not possible); 
·  and each investment in infrastructure is unique. 
Infrastructure investments and private involvement 
A number of aims can be pursued by private financing of infrastructure (ITS, 1999):  
·  minimising the impact of extra taxes, extra debt and/or extra financial guarantees; 
·  introduction of private sector advantages such as management and control; 
·  making available of private innovations in infrastructure projects; 
·  increasing the financial budgets for other projects. 
Given the characteristics of infrastructure and given the objectives of public and private 
parties, nevertheless it is perhaps possible for the government to involve private parties in 
infrastructure projects that offer no sufficient financial output at first sight. The market can 
be also involved in scope enlargement (e.g. coupling the realisation of infrastructure to area 
development)  (Langmyhr,  2001).  The  growing  lack  of  governmental  financial  resources 
makes it even more interesting to mobilise the market. Private financing of infrastructure is 
frequently  associated  with  continuing  public  involvement  and  responsibility  at  strategic 
network - and location planning. In the case of toll ways or urban mass-transit infrastructure, 
the government gives a concession to a private party for managing and developing certain 
infrastructure for a certain period. After expiring, the concession returns to the government. 
There are several ways the private sector can contribute to the development of the transport 
system (ITS, 1999). Firstly, the private party can be involved in financing the investment, 
where the operator of the infrastructure pays back the loan. This ensures that commercial 
aims are involved in  an  investment in  infrastructure. Secondly,  the  private  party can  be 
involved at the exploitation of the infrastructure, where the users ensure its turnover (toll, 
parking tariffs). This results in a development towards turnover maximisation, which can 
strongly  influence  social  objectives  (negatively).  Despite  of  the  higher  capital  costs  by 
private financing, the need to express risks in money and to ensure profits, it is frequently 
claimed that by involving private parties at infrastructure investments, the total costs for the 
society could be lower. However, the actual savings have never been scientifically proved. In 
the future, this will be extremely difficult (or maybe even impossible) to realise, because 
each infrastructure project is unique. Therefore, it is not possible to obtain actual realised 
savings of private involvement in infrastructure projects.  
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Conclusion 
From economics of the public sector perspective, several conclusions for PPP can be drawn. 
Firstly, from a cost point of view it is possible that the government is more efficient and the 
private party is more efficient in terms of turnover. Secondly, it is also possible that the 
government is more efficient in terms of turnovers and the private party in terms of costs. 
Thirdly,  there  are  several  reasons  for  the  government  to  interfere  in  economic  living. 
Reasons concerning infrastructure might be the public goods characterise and the external 
impacts. An important development is that the public characteristics of infrastructure are 
decreasing.  Finally,  in  general  it  is  unattractively  for  private  parties  to  invest  in 
infrastructure. 
3.2  Process management with PPP 
The development of infrastructure is a complex process. The key to a successful project is to 
accurately direct the input, interests and ambitions of the parties concerned. Research by 
Ghosh  and  Jintanapakanont  (2004)  shows  that  main  risk  factors  in  large  infrastructure 
projects are related to, delay, safety, social factors (e.g. public consultation), physical risk (of 
the  site),  and  subcontracter.  Before  and  during  the  development  process,  aim,  strategy, 
activities and resources must be constantly recalibrated and filled in again. Sometimes, new 
pulses  must  ensure  that  processes  that  got  bogged  down  are  smoothly  redrawn.  Process 
management  and surroundings management  become all the  more important. Long  et al., 
(2004) have identified 5 problem areas that exist for large construction projects. The areas 
are: i) incompetent designers/contractors; ii) poor estimation and change management; iii) 
social and technological issues; iv) site related issues; and v) improper techniques and tools. 
An important task when choosing for PPP and the institution of it is bringing together as 
much interests as possible. For this reason, process management is an important success 
factor in a lot of (Dutch) PPP-projects. 
Public-public and private-private cooperation 
More and more parties are involved in the infrastructure (and spatial) development. This 
results increasingly in public-public and private-private cooperation preceding the effective 
PPP. Both government and market parties organise themselves before cooperation between 
public and private parties comes up for discussion. In general, private parties are capable to 
organise  themselves  rapidly.  Moreover,  their  objectives  (profits)  and  interests  (business 
continuity) are generally clear and lie by nature frequently dense at each other. In order to 
counter this market party strength, the government is forced to organise itself well. If more 
governments take part in a PPP, it is essential that public-public cooperation has been agreed 
upon  before  agreements  with  the  market  are  made.    (Political)  objectives  from  the 
government  are  frequently  more  diverse  in  nature,  difficult  to  measure  and  not  always 
complementary.  Because  of  this,  making  agreements  between  public  parties  frequently 
progresses  less  rapidly.  Public-public  cooperation  frequently  appears  difficult  and  more 
complex  than  the  PPP.  The  public-public  agreements  help  to  form  a  common  vision, 
guarantee that is spoken with one mouth and prevent that governments work against each 
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Public-private cooperation 
Then the cooperation between public and private entities can be worked out. This is an 
intensive and careful process that exists from the following steps: 
·  Stakeholder analysis: Which parties (in the surroundings of the project) are 
important and have possibilities to contribute to the project (financially)? Electing 
the right parties to form a PPP sometimes proves to be an art in itself. Forming the 
PPP concerns creating assessment. This means that no important players are left out 
and on the other side also that not too much parties sit to the table; 
·  Common vision shaping. The interests and visions of the parties show differences 
and similarities. It is the task to find similarities in vision and to reciprocally respect 
differences in vision (if possible). A common vision brings people and organisations 
more closely together. The common vision forms the basis for cooperation; 
·  Feasibility analysis. The next step is to stipulate the feasibility of the common vision 
(the first test of the cooperation). Making a financial estimation for the project can 
be helpful. Preparing the financial overview is an instrument that can contribute to 
mutual faith and transparency, and forms an excellent appliance in search for the 
correct cooperation form. The financial estimation presents an exploitation overview 
of the project and is a basic form for the participating parties to find the cooperation 
with the best financial and social result; 
·  Agreements. After a positive result from the feasibility analysis, the different 
components of cooperation can be developed: i) exact risk division; ii) the financial 
design; iii) the organisation structure and the division of tasks, roles, powers and 
responsibilities; iv) the internal and external information - and communication 
structure; and v) the legal design; 
·  Decision-making. When it is clear who cooperates with who and what will be 
realised, it is best to fix the agreements through definite multi-annual agreements. 
This decision-making on the agreements is frequently a process on itself. Finally, 
this phase will result in drawing up a contract/agreement between the participating 
public and private parties or even in the establishment of an organisation with or 
without legal personality. 
It is no simple task to turn the PPP into a success. Hsieh et al., (2004) have found that change 
orders (procurement changes during construction) are important causes for cost and time 
overruns. A 10-17% ratio of change order cost to total project cost has been found. When the 
participating parties are persuaded of the advantages that the cooperation between public and 
private parties can offer, have chosen consciously for the PPP, and are prepared to invest in 
cooperation for the long-term, then PPP can offer means to pursue the defined objectives. In 
order to maximise the potential success, a contract must be drawn up and this can be done 
according to the eight step-appraoch developed by von Branconi and Loch (2004). They 
have identified 8 key business levers for a project contract: technical specifications, price 
(quality of the cost estimate), payment terms, schedule, performance guarantees, warranties, 
limitations of liability, and securities. 
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3.3  Business economics 
Business economics consists of a number of sub elements. Among other things, these sub 
elements are the venture, financing and the costs. Because of the desired private input at 
formerly public projects, these aspects become all the more important to the government. A 
Business is a for-profit (production) organisation (de Boer et al., 2004). For the PPP projects, 
generally, two sectors are very important: i) the construction sector; and ii) the banking 
sector. Construction businesses are production ventures, whereas the government and the 
banks operate in the service sector. This might signal possible problems between the sectors. 
The most important goal for the private sectors (as for other businesses) is the realisation of 
profits. Moreover, securing continuity is important for businesses. The number of businesses 
determines  the  market  in  a  certain  sector.  At  complete  competition,  there  are  many 
businesses  and  many  customers.  In  case  of  a  monopoly,  there  is  only  one  business.  At 
oligopoly there are only a limited number of businesses. Both the construction sector and the 
banking sector appear to be an oligopoly. 
Financing the activities of businesses and their costs 
Financing businesses is possible with own sources or with external financing. Own financing 
is money  put into the business  by  the owners for  an  indefinite period  of time. External 
financing is brought into the business by third parties. The asset and liability structure of the 
ventures  around  PPP  (or  maybe  the  PPP  itself)  are  less  interesting,  and  for  this  reason 
considered as given. The main question asked to the private party in a PPP project is: ‘do 
you want invest in this project’? Therefore, the investment must contribute to the venture 
objectives of profits and continuity. The viability of the business must at least be secured and 
ideally  be  increased.  Businesses  have  several  methods  to  assess  this.  For  that  purpose, 
among  other  things,  they  calculate  the  deserving  periods,  the  average  annual  profit,  the 
internal profitability and the net cash value (de Boer et al., 2004). In order to assess the 
realisation of the objectives of companies, the money- and good flows in a company must be 
registered. The information is used to be able to control the venture and to be able to justify 
the delivered performances. The costs within a company can be classified in a lot of different 
manners, which stipulates the realised profit. An important classification is the one whereby 
the costs of input, labour, durable production resources, ground, service, taxes and financing 
are calculated. 
Conclusion 
Business economics offers insight in the way in which companies operate and what possible 
consequences might be for the government within PPP projects. Firstly, the construction 
businesses are production ventures, whereas banking services and the government operate in 
the service industry. This might ensure possible problems in the common implementation of 
the PPP projects. Secondly, the market of the most important private parties that are involved 
in PPP is an oligopoly. Thirdly, profits at banks are rather constant, whereas construction 
companies have activities that are more cyclic and therefore profits vary more. Finally, the 
construction companies have relatively high fixed costs and at the banks the cost of labour is 
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4  Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  a  literature  review  has  been  presented  on  the  subject  of  public  private 
partnerships for the development of infrastructure projects. The central question in the paper 
was: ‘Is PPP a viable option for investments in infrastructure from a theoretical point of 
view?’  First,  a  description  has  been  presented  on  the  backgrounds  of  public-private 
partnerships  and  on  investments  in  infrastructure.  Secondly,  three  theoretical  disciplines 
have been analysed in order to answer the problem definition.  
The description of the backgrounds of the infrastructure projects and the analysis of the term 
PPP  lead  to  a  number  of  conclusions.  Firstly,  the  role  of  the  national  and  regional 
governments  in  financing  infrastructure  is  changing.  This  changing  role  means  that  the 
national governments withdraw  themselves  on  core  functions.  Regional governments are 
given more responsibilities. In general this means more smaller infrastructure projects that 
are less suitable for PPP. Secondly, the theoretical definition of PPP and the more practical 
definition differ. In Europe, most PPPs in infrastructure are worked out as a concession (and 
therefore not a real PPP). This means that aroused hopes for advantages in practice, partly do 
not materialise due to the theoretical main issues. The concessions in Europe appear to be 
expensive agreements between public and private parties that lead to some financiel relief for 
public parties in the short run. A complicating factor is the large diversity in projects that 
might qualify for PPP. More specific, each infrastructure project is unique, making it even 
more difficult to implement cooperation.  
The theoretical perspectives from the discipline ‘economics of the public sector’ result in 
some interesting insights. Firstly, from a cost point of view it is possible that the government 
is more efficient and the private party is more efficient in terms of turnover. This could also 
be the case for the development of infrastructure (e.g. the government being able to attract 
cheaper  finance).  Therefore,  it  might  be  worthwhile  to  identify  costs  and  benefits  for 
government and private businesses in order to combine the strong points. Secondly, PPP is 
no solution to the budgetary shortages of governments. The financial cost reduction for the 
government is not proven scientifically so far. Till recently, indications for financial cost 
reductions based on estimates seem to be sufficient. The inclusion of private parties will 
probably result in efficiency but also in cost increases. Thirdly, PPP seems to increase the 
quality of public services, but at a higher cost. Furthermore, the exact realised efficiency is 
never to be found, because a comparison (actual numbers) between a PPP and the traditional 
way can’t be made.  
Process managment shows that it is no simple task to turn a PPP into a success. When the 
participating parties are persuaded of the advantages that the cooperation between public and 
private parties can offer, have chosen consciously for the PPP, and are prepared to invest in 
cooperation for the long-term, then PPP can offer means to pursue the defined objectives. If 
true cooperation is aimed for, costs, risks, and profits must be shared instead of devided. The 
joint venture can provide insights into the process of sharing. 
The  theoretical  perspectives  offered  by  business  economics  provide  insight  in  the  way 
businesses  operate  and  what  the  consequences  are  for  cooperation  with  investments  in Concessions to PPP  16 
infrastructure.  Firstly,  in  general  it  is  unattractively  for  private  parties  to  invest  in 
infrastructure.  In  order  to  make  it  more  attractive,  profits  can  be  offered  to  the  private 
parties. However, this will increase the total costs of the project. Overall, the major problems 
lie  in  the  distinction  between  public  responsibilities  and  private  aspirations.  The  main 
conclusions are given in the table below. 
Table 2 Is PPP a viable option? 
Yes  No 
Economics of the public sector   
Reduce budget shortages (g)  Reduced number of large projects (d) 
Cost reduction for government (g)  Cost for large projects are underestimated (f) 
Better quality of public services (g)  PPP is not the right scope (f) 
Public goods characteristics are decreasing (d)  Allocation of costs/risk instead of coop (f) 
   
Organisation management   
Project efficiency (g)   
   
Business economics   
Profits for private companies (g/f)  Not-profitable parts of projects (f) 
Development of new markets (g)  Infrastructure is unattractive (f) 
   
G = goal, d = development, f = fact 
 
Theory and facts prove that PPP seems not a very viable option for investments in infrastructure 
(the right part ‘no’ of the table). The left part is the arguments in favour of PPP. However, most 
arguments are not proven but appear to be ‘positive‘goals that are aimed for by PPP. While the 
right part of the table appear to be facts that are proven scientifically. 
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